

portant points in Bosanquet's philosophy perhaps more clearly than has been done anywhere else. He maintains a realist epistemology (not metaphysic) in terms as emphatic as any realist, declaring that "to say that something new is produced by the process of knowledge is to destroy knowledge",¹ though at the same time he holds that the external world is a form of *experience*.² He applies the same epistemological doctrine to art and poetry—"If you told any artist that his 'creation' was not a revelation of beauty already inherent in the universe—not a revelation of pre-existing reality, he would beyond any doubt reply 'Then I have failed' . . . The idea of making is limited. You can bring into temporal existence the eternal values, but you cannot make them to be what they are. You cannot make beauty beauty, or truth true. You can only unveil, 're-veal', them. Making can only affect temporal existence. This I hold to be fundamental in all experience and in Logic".³ To this much-needed criticism of the Italian school he adds a spirited re-assertion of the principle that all judgments must be both analytic and synthetic.⁴

Philosophical views like Bosanquet's are at present undergoing a season of eclipse, and his mode of expression is still more apt nowadays to be regarded with disapproval, but we may yet trust that anyone who reads this book intelligently will be certain of one thing, namely, that it would be an irreparable loss if the general spirit and outlook in philosophy for which his work stood were to be left without representatives, however different the language may be in which it is best expressed to the men of our day.

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Philosophical Studies. BY THE LATE J. M^CT. ELLIS M^CTAGGART.
 Edited, with an Introduction, by S. V. KEELING, M.A., D.-ES-L.
 London: Edward Arnold, 1934. Pp. 292. 12s. 6d.

DR. KEELING has collected eleven papers of McTaggart's, which were either unpublished or scattered in back-numbers of *MIND* and other periodicals. He has prefaced them with an introduction and has provided them with notes referring the reader to relevant passages in McTaggart's published books.

The essays cover a period of thirty years, from 1893, when McTaggart was twenty-seven years old, to 1923, two years before his death. As Dr. Keeling points out, there was no fundamental change during this period in McTaggart's views on the nature of metaphysics or in his metaphysical conclusions, but there was a profound change in his method of proof. Always a highly unorthodox Hegelian, he ended by proving conclusions which he thought to be more or less Hegelian by straightforward deductive arguments from self-evident premises, instead of by the Hegelian method of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

The only one of these papers hitherto unpublished is the ninth. This is a syllabus of McTaggart's popular lectures on philosophy which he gave year after year to Cambridge undergraduates who were interested in the subject but were not reading it for their degree. It is an extremely clear and condensed synopsis of his general views on philosophy and his reasons for them. It should be compared with the eleventh essay, *An Ontological Idealism*, which is a most remarkable summary in twenty pages of

¹ p. 301.

² *ib.*

³ pp. 258-259.

⁴ p. 259 (*cf.*, pp. 34-35).

McTaggart's final position as expounded in the two volumes of *The Nature of Existence*. The tenth paper, *The Further Determination of the Absolute*, is the one in which McTaggart first professed to prove an important proposition which the Fairy Queen in *Iolanthe* had already asserted:

‘And in fact you will discover
That we almost live on lover!’

This was privately printed when McTaggart was a young man. A considerable part of it was reproduced in his *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, but the complete essay has never before been available to the general public.

All the other articles have been published completely before; but some of them, e.g., *Dare to be Wise*, *Mysticism*, and *The Individualism of Value* (Essays I, II, and IV), were very difficult to get hold of. *The Individualism of Value* would have been well worth reprinting at the present time if only for its concluding sentences: ‘Compared with worship of the State, zoolatry is rational and dignified. A bull or a crocodile may not have great intrinsic value; but it has some, for it is a conscious being. The State has none. It would be as reasonable to worship a sewage-pipe, which also possesses considerable value as a means.’

The two very important essays on time, *The Unreality of Time* and *The Relation of Time to Eternity*, have since been embodied in *The Nature of Existence*. The same is true of the third and seventh essays, *Personality*, and *The Meaning of Causality*. As they are intelligible by themselves, and highly important contributions to philosophy, it is very useful to have them reprinted. The one remaining essay, *Propositions Applicable to Themselves*, shows how well McTaggart could deal with purely logical questions when he chose to do so.

The philosophical public are under an obligation to Dr. Keeling, for the trouble that he has taken in collecting and annotating these papers, and to Messrs. Arnold for their enterprise in making the results of Dr. Keeling's labours available in a pleasant binding at a moderate price.

C. D. BROAD.

Irrational oder Rational? By WILLY FREYTAG. Junker und Dünnhaupt, Berlin. Pp. 236. M.9.

THIS may best be described as “an admirable book as far as it goes.” It is lucid, sound and logically coherent throughout, and it is only open to one serious criticism, but this is unfortunately one which considerably diminishes its value. The criticism is that, while on its own ground the argument is logically unanswerable, it puts too narrow an interpretation on the views which it attacks, so that at times one feels doubtful whether the author has not merely built a man of straw for the pleasure of knocking him down. Thus, as his main thesis, he shows convincingly and at somewhat excessive length, against the school of Vaihinger, that according to the established rules of formal logic it is not possible to *prove* any conclusion from false or unjustified premisses. This is no doubt true, and it absolutely disposes of “fictionalism” naively understood. But, while I must admit that my knowledge of the “fictionalist” school does not extend beyond Vaihinger's “Philosophy of the ‘As If’”, which is, however, the book principally discussed by our author, it seems clear to me that there are various senses in which it might be much more plausibly